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11.1  Introduction 
In this paper we  examine the link between changes in the minimum 
wage and employment outcomes for the youth (under age 31) labor mar- 
ket, in France and the United States. We make use of longitudinal data 
on employment status and earnings to see how individuals are affected by 
real increases (in the case of  France) or real decreases (in the case of the 
United States) in the minimum wage conditional on the individual’s loca- 
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tion in the earnings distribution. We  take particular care to distinguish 
subpopulations that might be affected differently by the minimum wage, 
focusing in particular on low-wage workers and (in the case of  France, 
where the data are available) on the use of employment promotion con- 
tracts that allow the payment of subminimum wages. 
Although little attention has been paid to the situation in Europe,' some 
European countries provide interesting alternatives to the much studied 
U.S.  case. France, in particular,  seems a perfect contrast to the United 
States. Whereas in the United States the nominal federal minimum wage 
remained constant for most states during most of the 1980s (thus implying 
a  declining  real  federal  minimum  wage),  nominal  minimum  wages  in 
France rose steadily over the 1980s, as did real minimum wages. In this 
paper we exploit the different growth patterns in real minimum wages in a 
symmetric manner to more clearly understand their effect on employment. 
Most existing studies of the French minimum wage system use aggre- 
gate time-series data and find no effect of the minimum wage system on 
youth employment (see, e.g., Bazen and Martin 1991). This is surprising 
because, since the inception of the minimum wage, a significant percent- 
age of  the French labor force has been employed at wages close to that 
level. One reason  for the orientation in the empirical analyses done in 
France is, certainly, the tendency of American applied researchers to rely 
on aggregate time-series analyses' prior to the widespread dissemination 
of public-use microeconomic data such as the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). Another reason is that research access to French microdata was 
extremely limited until the 1990s. In the present study we use microdata 
from France and the United States collected in household surveys that are 
quite comparable. In particular, we  use longitudinal information on the 
workers. Consequently, we are able to analyze both French and American 
minimum wage systems using individual-level panel data. 
Because of the dramatic differences between the evolution of both nom- 
inal and real French minimum wages and that of the national US. mini- 
mum,3  we have designed statistical comparisons that address the same be- 
use Current Population Survey (CPS) files provided by  the Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
the Bureau of the Census. David Card graciously provided the computer code for implement- 
ing the Census Bureau CPS matching algorithms used in this paper. The French data were 
taken  from the Enqucte Emploi research  files constructed by  the Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE, the French national statistical agency). The 
French data are also public-use samples. For further information contact INSEE, Dkpdrte- 
ment de la Diffusion,  18 bd Adolphe Pinard, 75675 Paris Cedex 14,  France. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors, not the U.S. Census Bureau. The paper was 
completed before Abowd assumed his appointment. 
1. See Dolado et al. (1996) for a summary of minimum wage studies for France, the Neth- 
erlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
2. See Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) for a review. 
3. We do not consider state-specific minimum wages or youth subminimum wages in the 
United States, which became increasingly important at the end of the 1980s. See Neumark Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  429 
havior  using  the  different  variations  in  the  national  minimum  wage 
systems to identify the relevant effects. We use two different statistical ap- 
proaches based on the same idea: analysis of employment transition prob- 
abilities conditional on the position  of an individual in the wage distri- 
bution. In each approach, we decompose the wage distribution into four 
components (under,  around, marginally  over,  and  over  the  minimum 
wage). We then, in our first approach, use a multinomial logit model to 
analyze the factors that affect the probability of making a transition be- 
tween a particular position in the wage distribution and employment or 
nonemployment (in the case of France) or between employment or non- 
employment and the position in the wage distribution (in the case of the 
United States). We find that young workers paid  around the minimum 
wage in France were more likely to transition to a nonemployment state 
(unemployment or inactivity) than those paid over the minimum wage and 
that, for French men, such differences were greater in years where major 
increases in the minimum wage occurred. In the United States, we find 
that among workers currently employed  around the minimum  wage, a 
larger  share were  in  a nonemployment  state the previous  period  than 
among workers above the minimum wage. In both cases, the effects are 
strongest for the youngest workers. We find some minor “spillover” effects 
in both cases and provide evidence to suggest that these effects capture 
some of the heterogeneity between low-wage and high-wage labor markets. 
In the second approach, we  exploit  the size of the movements in the 
real minimum wage more dire~tly.~  For France, we use the automatic and 
legislated increases in  the nominal  minimum wage that occur (at least) 
each July to identify groups of workers whose current wage rate will fall 
below the new minimum wage rate  after the increase. We  also identify 
workers whose present employment is part of a special youth program 
that permits wage payments below the statutory minimum. We  use the 
limited duration of employment spells in such programs to identify a sec- 
ond group of minimum wage employment effects. Our statistical analysis 
identifies the change in future employment probabilities given an individu- 
al’s minimum wage status in the present period. We show that individuals 
whose reference year wage was between the two real minimum wages, as 
defined above, have substantially lower subsequent employment probabili- 
ties than those who were not. The conditional elasticity  of subsequent 
nonemployment as a function of the real minimum wage for young male 
workers in France in this situation, evaluated at sample means, is  -2.5. 
This effect is present  even when unobserved  labor market heterogeneity 
and Wascher (1992) for an explicit treatment of this variation in the U.S. data. Similarly, we 
do  not explicitly control for minimum wages specified by collective agreement in France that 
exceed the national minimum. See Margolis (1993) for a detailed treatment of the effects of 
the collective bargaining agreement salary grids on employment. 
4. Our analysis bears some resemblance to that of Linneman (1982). 430  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
and supply behavior are partially controlled for by the inclusion of a sepa- 
rate category for workers marginally over the minimum. However, the im- 
pact of the minimum wage decreases with experience. We also show that 
youths who participated in employment programs had lower subsequent 
employment probabilities. For the United States we  use the constancy of 
the nominal minimum wage between 1981 and 1987 to identify groups of 
employed workers whose real wage in the present period would have been 
below the real minimum wage in the previous period. We show that young 
men whose wages were between the two real minimum wages, as described 
above, had lower employment probabilities  in the previous period than 
individuals who were not (the conditional elasticity, evaluated at sample 
means, is 2.2). These effects get worse with age in the United States and 
are mitigated by eligibility for special employment promotion contracts in 
France. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1  1.2 provides some in- 
stitutional background on the systems of minimum wages in both France 
and the United States and provides some preliminary indications of the 
potential impact in each case based on empirical wage distributions. Sec- 
tion 1 1.3 describes the data that we use to analyze the impact of minimum 
wages, and section  11.4 lays out the statistical models used to evaluate 
the employment effects of minimum wage changes. Section  11.5 details 
the results of our multinomial logit analysis, and section 11.6 discusses the 
conditional logit analyses. Section 1 1.7 concludes. 
11.2  Institutional Background 
1  1.2.1  France 
The first minimum wage law in France was enacted in  1950, creating a 
guaranteed hourly wage rate that was partially indexed to the rate of in- 
crease in consumer prices. Beginning in 1970, the original minimum wage 
law was replaced by the current system (called the salaire minimum inter- 
professionnel de croissance-SMIC)  linking the changes in the minimum 
wage to both consumer price inflation and growth in the hourly blue-collar 
wage rate. In addition to formula-based increases in the SMIC, the govern- 
ment legislated increases many times over the next two decades. The statu- 
tory minimum wage in France regulates the hourly regular cash compen- 
sation  received  by  an employee, including  the employee’s part of  any 
payroll taxes.5 
5. In theory, no provisions in any of the minimum wage laws allow regional variation in 
the SMIC.  In some sectors in the French economy, however, the effective minimum wage was 
determined by (often extended) collective bargaining agreements. These agreements typically 
covered entire regions and industries, especially when extended to nonbargaining employers. 
Although relatively important in the 1970s, these provisions became increasingly irrelevant Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the US.  431 
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Fig. 11.1  Monthly minimum wage: France 
Figure 1  1.1 shows the time series for the French minimum wage and the 
associated employee-paid and employer-paid payroll taxes. Because of the 
extensive use of payroll taxes to finance mandatory employee benefits, by 
the 1980s the French minimum wage imposed a substantially greater cost 
on the employer than its statutory value. Employees share in the legal 
allocation  of the payroll  taxes,  as the figure shows; however, low-wage 
workers benefit substantially more than the average worker from the social 
security systems financed through these taxes in proportion to their reve- 
nue (unemployment insurance, health care, retirement income, and em- 
ployment programs, in particular). Appendix table 1  1A.  1 provides a com- 
plete statistical history of the real and nominal SMIC, including employer 
and employee payroll tax components. 
Figure 11.2 shows the real hourly French minimum wage from 1951 to 
1994. Although the original minimum wage program (called the suluire 
minimum interprofessionnel gurunti-SMIG)  was only partially indexed- 
in particular the inflation rate had to exceed 5 percent per year (2 percent 
from  1957 to 1970) to trigger the indexation-the  real minimum wage 
did not decline measurably over the entire postwar period and increased 
substantially during most decades. 
The French minimum wage lies near most of the mass of the wage rate 
distribution for  the  employed  workforce.  To  show the location  of the 
SMIC in this distribution, we plotted the empirical distribution of hourly 
during the 1980s (our period of analysis) as the collective agreement nominal salary grids 
remained fixed in the face of an increasing nominal SMIC. See Margolis (1993) for a discus- 






wage rates for  1990, the earliest year for which the Labor Force Survey 
reports continuous wage data. Figure 1 1.3 shows these data. We have indi- 
cated the SMIC directly on the figure. Notice that the first mode of the 
wage distribution is within F 5 of the minimum wage and the second mode 
is within F 10 of the minimum. In the overall distribution, 13.6 percent of 
the wage earners lie at or  below the minimum wage and an additional 14.4 
percent lie within an additional F 5 per hour of the SMIC. 
Dolado et al. (1996) discuss the incidence of the SMIC with respect to 
household income. They find that although people employed at the SMIC 
do tend to be in the poorest households, the distribution of “smicards” 
(people paid  the SMIC) is not monotonically  decreasing in  household 
income.  For example,  they find  that the  share of  individuals paid  the 
SMIC in each decile of household income increases from 10.1 percent in 
the lowest decile to 13.1 percent in the third lowest decile, then decreases 
to 6.6 percent for the fifth decile, increases to 7.4 percent for the sixth 
decile and declines monotonically to 0.6 percent in the highest decile of 
household income. 
1 1.2.2  United States 
The first national minimum wage in the United States was a part of the 
original Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of  1938. The American na- 
tional minimum wage has never been indexed and increases only when 
legislative changes are enacted. The national minimum  applies only to 
workers covered by the FLSA, whose coverage has been extended over the 
years to include most jobs. The statutory minimum wage regulates  the Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  433 
Hourly wage rate net of employee  payroll taxes (francs) 
Fig. 11.3  Empirical distribution of hourly wages: France, 1990 
Hourly wage rate including  employee payroll taxes (dollars) 
Fig. 11.4  Empirical distribution of hourly wages: United States, 1981 
hourly regular cash compensation received by an employee including the 
employee's part of any payroll taxes. 
Figures  11.4 and 11.5 show the distribution  of the American  hourly 
wage rate and the location of the minimum wage in that distribution for 
1981 and 1987, the beginning and ending years of our analyses.6  For 1981, 
17.7 percent of the employed workforce had wage rates at or below the 
minimum wage and an additional  14.6 percent had wage rates within an 
additional $1.00 per hour of the minimum. For 1987, only 9.5 percent of 
employed persons had hourly wage rates at or below the minimum while 
an additional 9.9 percent lay within an additional $1.00 per hour of the 
minimum. 
6. It should be noted that the federal minimum wage was increased to $3.35 per hour 
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Fig. 11.5  Empirical distribution of hourly wages: United States, 1987 
11.3  Data Description 
11.3.1  France 
The French data were extracted from the EnquCte Emploi (Labor Force 
Survey) for the years 1982-89.  The 60,000 households included in the La- 
bor Force Survey sample are interviewed in March of three consecutive 
years with one-third of the households replaced each year. Every member 
of the household is surveyed and followed provided that he or she does 
not move during the three years. We  used the INSEE research files for 
each of the indicated years. These files include identifiers that allowed us 
to follow individuals from year to year. Using these identifiers we created 
year-to-year matched files for the years 1982-83 to 1988-89. 
The survey measures usual monthly earnings, net of employee payroll 
taxes but including employee income taxes, and usual weekly hours. Usual 
monthly earnings is measured in  20  intervals of widths varying from F 
500 to F 5,000. It is important to note that the narrowest intervals were 
used for the lowest salaries. We  take the categorical nature of our wage 
data explicitly into account in our analyses, in that we  compare the de- 
clared wage category against the wage category in which an individual 
working the same number of  hours per  month  at the SMIC would  be 
found. 
Certain young workers were employed in publicly funded programs that 
either combined classroom education with work (“upprentis,” “stuge de 
quul@cution,” or “stage  dinsertion, contrut emploi-formation”)  or provide 
subsidized low-wage employment (“truvaux dutilitk collective” or “stuge 
dinitiution a la vieprofessionnelle,” both from 1985 to 1989). All of these 
programs provide a legal exemption from the SMIC and from certain pay- 
roll taxes. Most of these programs are limited to workers 25 years  old 
and under. Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the US.  435 
The employment status in year t is equal to one for all individuals who 
are employed in March of the survey year and equal to zero otherwise. 
The French Labor Force Survey definition of employment is the same as 
the one used by the International Labour Office: a person is employed if 
he or she worked for pay for at least one hour during the reference week. 
The definition is thus consistent with the American Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics (BLS) definition used below. 
Our control variables consisted of  education, labor force experience, 
seniority, region of France, date of labor force entry, and year. Education 
was constructed as eight categories: none, completed elementary school, 
completed  junior  high  school,  completed  basic  vocational/technical 
school, completed advanced vocational/technical school, completed high 
school (baccafaurgat),  completed technical college or undergraduate uni- 
versity, and completed graduate school or postcollege professional school. 
Labor force experience was computed as the difference between current 
age and age at school exit. Seniority was measured as the response to a 
direct question on the survey (years with the present employer). Region is 
an indicator variable for the Ile de France (Paris metropolitan area) as the 
region of residence. 
The SMIC data were taken from Bayet (1994), which reports official 
INSEE statistics. We selected the hourly SMIC for March of the indicated 
year, net of employee payroll taxes. 
1 1.3.2  United States 
We used the official BLS public-use outgoing rotation group files from 
the CPS for the months January to May and September to December and 
the years 1981-87.  We applied the Census Bureau matching algorithm to 
create year-to-year linked files for the years 1981-82  to 1986-87. 
The outgoing rotation  groups (households being interviewed for the 
fourth or eighth time in the CPS rotation schedule) are asked to report 
usual weekly wage and usual weekly hours. Individuals who normally are 
paid by the hour are asked to report that wage rate directly. We created an 
hourly wage rate using the directly reported hourly wage rate when avail- 
able and the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual weekly hours other- 
wise. Respondents are asked to report these wage measures gross of em- 
ployee payroll taxes, so they are not directly comparable to the measures 
constructed from the French data, which are reported net of  employee 
payroll  taxes.  We  created  real  hourly  wage  rates  by  dividing  by  the 
1982-84-based  Consumer Price Index for All Urban Workers for the ap- 
propriate month. 
We created a second set of hourly wage measures for the United States 
that included income from tips in the hourly wage. To do this we computed 
a  second  hourly  wage  rate as usual  weekly earnings divided  by  usual 
weekly hours for workers who reported that they were paid by the hour. 436  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T. Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
When this second hourly wage rate exceeded the one directly reported, we 
used  the computed measure. This measure  of hourly wage rate is used 
below in the analysis labeled “including income from tips.” 
An individual is employed in year t if he or she worked at least one hour 
for pay during the second week of  the survey month. We  used the CPS 
employment status recode variable to determine employment. The BLS 
definition is thus consistent with the one used in the French Labor Force 
Survey. 
Our control variables consist of education, potential labor force experi- 
ence, race, marital status, and region. Education was constructed as the 
number of  years required to reach the highest grade completed. For the 
multinomial logit analysis, this was decomposed into six categories: less 
than junior high school (no diploma), junior high school, high school, less 
than four years of college, four years of college, and more than four years 
of college. Potential labor force experience is age minus years of education 
minus five. Race is one for nonwhite individuals. Marital  status is  one 
for married persons. Region is  a set of three indicator variables for the 
northeastern, north-central, and southern parts of the United States. 
The U.S.  national nominal minimum wage was $3.35 throughout  our 
analysis period.’ 
1 1.3.3  Empirical Transition Probabilities 
A preliminary analysis of the empirical transition probabilities of young 
workers into or out of employment based on their positions in the wage 
distribution relative to the minimum wage suggests that one might expect 
to see significant impacts of the minimum wage on employment probabili- 
ties in both France and the United States. In the case of France, we  are 
concerned with that probability that an individual is employed at the date 
t  + 1 given the person’s employment status and wage rate relative to the 
SMIC (if employed) at date t. In the case of the United States, the question 
is whether or not an individual was employed at date t given his or her 
employment status and wage rate relative to the minimum wage (if em- 
ployed) at date t + 1. 
Let miw, be the nominal hourly minimum net wage in year t, rmiw, be 
the real hourly minimum net wage in year t, and h, represent the number 
of monthly hours worked in the sample month in year t. For France let 
wcut, be the category in which the individual’s nominal net monthly earn- 
ings falls in year  t, and for the United  States let  w, be the individual’s 
hourly net wage rate in year t and rw, be the real net wage for year t. 
7. Throughout  the period, and particularly toward the end, some states independently 
increased their nominal  wages above the national  level. We  do not  explicitly account for 
state-by-state variation in the nominal minimum wage. See Neumark and Wascher (1992) 
for an analysis, using a different methodology, of the effects of interstate variation of mini- 
mum wages in the United States. Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  437 
For France define micat, as the earnings category into which expected 
nominal monthly earnings at the SMIC (h, X miw,) would fall, and order 
the categories from 1 (less than F 500 per month) to 15 (over F 45,000 per 
month). Then we  define the following six departure (occupied at date t) 
states: 
out of the labor force at t, 
unemployed at t, 
employed at t and paid under the SMIC: Z(wcat, < micat,) = 1, 
employed at t and paid the SMIC: Z(wcat, = micat,) = 1, 
employed at t and paid marginally over the SMIC: Z(wcat, = micat, + 1) 
employed at t and paid over the SMIC: Z(wcat, >  micat, + 1) = 1, 
where I(-)  is the indicator function taking the value one when the condi- 
tion is true and zero otherwise. We  also define two arrival (occupied at 
date t + 1) states: 
employed at t + 1 and 
not employed at t + 1. 
For the United States recall that the nominal minimum wage was con- 
stant over the entire sample period at $3.35 per hour. Thus we construct 
six arrival states: 
out of the labor force at t + 1, 
unemployed at t + 1, 
employed at t + 1 and paid under the minimum wage: Z(wltl  <  $3.25) = 1, 
employed at t + 1 and paid the minimum wage: Z($3.25 5  w,,, < $3.50) 
employed at t  + 1 and paid marginally over the minimum wage: 1($3.50 
employed at t + 1 and paid over the minimum wage: Z(W,+~  L $4.00) = 1. 
We have the same two departure states: 
employed at t and 
not employed at t. 
Using these definitions, figures 11.6 and  11.7 describe the breakdown 
of the population and the change in the real hourly minimum wage for 
French young men and women, respectively, and figures  11.8 and 11.9 
show the corresponding breakdowns and changes for U.S. young men and 
women, respectively. Table  1 1.1 describes the distribution of transitions 
over the sample periods for the French data, and table 11.2 describes the 
distribution of transitions for the American data. 
In the case of the United States, it is clear from looking at the raw 
transition probabilities  that minimum  wage workers  are different  from 
= 1, and 
= 1, 
5  w,,~  < $4.00) = 1, and 438  J. M. Abowd, F. Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Marpolis 
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Population breakdown by earnings and evolution of real SMIC: French 
0 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1981 
YU, 
Fig. 11.7  Population breakdown by earnings and evolution of real SMIC: French 
young women 
their higher paid counterparts. A much larger share of the population em- 
ployed at the minimum wage at date t +  1 comes from the nonworking 
pool (42.92 percent) than does the share of  the population employed far 
over the minimum wage (only 12.28 percent). The case in  France is less 
clear, since the difference between the share of workers paid at the SMIC 
who are not employed the following period (6.63 percent) and the share 
paid over the SMIC who are not employed the following period (12.16 
percent) is much less dramatic, and even goes in the opposite direction 
from the U.S. result. These effects may, however, be due to the presence 
of various sorts of  employment promotion contracts, which might shield 
workers paid at or under the SMIC from layoffs. Such effects would not Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  439 
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Fig. 11.9  Population breakdown by earnings and evolution of real minimum wage: 
U.S. young women 
be visible in these cross-tabulations,  and our conditional logit results go 
to great lengths to try to discriminate between the effects of the contracts 
and the effects of the minimum wage. 
It should be noted that the transition behavior of workers paid margin- 
ally over the minimum is, in both countries, intermediate between the tran- 
sitions made by those paid at the minimum and those paid over the mini- 
mum. This “spillover” effect could be capturing a degree of heterogeneity 
between low-wage and high-wage workers, and we will exploit this control 
group in what follows. 
Clearly, this descriptive analysis is not sufficient to discredit the hypoth- 
esis that low-wage workers are, in some way,  qualitatively different from 
high-wage workers; in fact, the spillover effect noted above suggests that Table 11.1  Transition Probabilities for France 
To Nonemployment  To Employment 
Under  Marginal  Over 
From  Out of  LF  Unemployed  Total  SMIC  At SMlC  SMIC  SMIC  Total  Total 
Out of labor force 
Overall Yl, 
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2,434  14,665 
2.82  16.97 
16.60  I00 
4.08  111.8 
3,215  1 1,276 
3.72  13.05 
28.51  100 
5.39  100.33 
2,314  2,334 
2.68  2.70 
99.14  I00 
3.88  39.1 
3,985  4,268 
4.61  4.94 
93.37  100 
6.69  56.1 
7,365  7,991 
8.52  9.25 
92.17  100 
12.36  84.  I 
40,296  45,876 
46.63  53.09 
87.84  I00 
67.60  208.5 
59,609  86,410 
68.98  100 
417.62  600 
100  600 
Source. French Labor Force Survey, 1982-89,  matched year to year. 
Nore: Table reports on people aged 30 or under. Table 11.2  Transition Probabilities for the United States 
To 
From 
out  of  Under  At  Marginal  Over 
LF  Unemployed  Minimum  Minimum  Minimum  Minimum  Total 
Nonemployment 
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(continued) Table 11.2  (continued) 
To 
out  of  Under  At  Marginal  Over 
From  LF  Unemployed  Minimum  Minimum  Minimum  Minimum  Total 
Marginal minimum  1,09  1  485  323  673  1,534  3,467  7,573 
OVerdll Yo  0.83  0.37  0.25  0.5 1  1.17  2.65  5.78 
Row Ya  14.41  6.40  4.27  8.89  20.26  45.78  100 
Column YO  3.13  4.85  3.34  9.10  21.52  5.59  47.53 
Over minimum  3,046  2,443  1,123  874  1,211  46,674  55,971 
Overall YO  2.33  1.86  1.32  0.67  0.92  35.63  42.72 
Row Yo  5.44  4.36  3.08  1.56  2.16  83.39  I00 
Column YO  8.75  24.41  17.82  11.81  16.99  75.28  155.06 
Total  7,093  4,067  7,508  4,223  4,737  54,390  82,018 
Overall 'YO  5.41  3.10  5.73  3.22  3.62  41.52  62.60 
Row  %1  8.65  4.96  9.15  5.15  5.78  66.31  100 
Column 'Yu  20.38  40.63  77.66  57.08  66.41  87.72  349.94 
Total  34,804  10,010  9,668  7,398  1,127  62,002  131,009 
26.57  7.64  7.38  5.65  5.44  47.33  100 
141.2  58.21  71.4  55.66  56.89  2 16.70  600 
100  100  100  100  100  I00  600 
Source: US. Current Population Survey, 1981-87,  January-May  and September-December,  matched year to year. 
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such heterogeneity may exist. To separate out this effect, we need to con- 
trol for worker characteristics and analyze more carefully the transitions 
between employment and nonemployment.* 
11.4  Statistical Models for the Minimum Wage Effects on Employment 
In order to  control for the impact that variables, including the minimum 
wage and its movements, might have on labor market transitions, we ap- 
plied two different statistical techniques. In the first approach, we  use a 
multinomial logit analysis to try to control for factors that might render 
low-wage workers different from other workers and could thereby affect 
their transition probabilities. We analyze the raw transitions and describe 
the factors that increase or reduce the probability of transitions involving 
nonemployment and how these factors differentially affect minimum wage 
and above minimum wage workers. In the second approach, we exploit 
the size of the increases to categorize workers as “between” old and new 
values of the real minimum wage (i.e., with an hourly real wage rate lying 
between the old and the new real minimum  wage), and we  use a logit 
analysis of subsequent (or prior) employment probabilities to see if work- 
ers who might be directly affected by  minimum wage increases have sig- 
nificantly different subsequent (or prior) employment probabilities. 
1 1.4.1  Multinomial Logit Analysis 
Using the same definitions of states as in subsection 11.3.3, we regroup 
the unemployed  and inactive states into a single state, nonemployment. 
Using the notation N = nonemployment, E = employment, U = under 
the minimum, A = at the minimum, M = marginally over the minimum, 
and 0 = over the minimum, we can define the set of possible transitions 
for each country. Thus for France there are 10 possible transitions: 0 to 
E or 0  to N, M to E or M to N, A to E or A to N, U to E or U to N, and 
N to E or N to N. For the United States there are 10 symmetric transitions: 
E to 0 or N to 0, E to M or N to M, E to A or N to A, E to U or N to 
U, and E to N or N to N. We use a multinomial logit approach to control 
for observable factors while allowing for a common shock. For interpreta- 
tion, however, we are particularly concerned with the conditional transi- 
tion probabilities. 
In the French case, we are interested in the probability of transition out 
of employment conditional on the position in the earnings distribution. 
8. There remains a possibility that unobserved worker heterogeneity might bias our results 
in sections 11.5 and 11.6. Because of selection considerations and sample sizes, we were not 
able to use standard (Hsiao 1986) or nonstandard (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999) 
techniques to control for these effects. Thus we  are forced to suppose that the inclusion of 
the “marginally above” the minimum wage group is sufficient to capture any heterogeneity 
in transition rates that is correlated with wages. 444  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
For the United  States, we  are interested in the initial state of a worker 
conditional on his or her ex post position in the earnings distribution. In 
each of these cases, we have in mind the hypothesis of a competitive labor 
market, and thus a model in which a worker with a given marginal produc- 
tivity (equal to the wage) closer to the minimum wage might be more at 
risk to transit out of employment in France or to have come from nonem- 
ployment in the United States than an observationally equivalent worker 
paid above the minimum wage. We suppose that those workers employed 
at wages marginally above the minimum share unobservable characteris- 
tics that affect transition probabilities in the absence of a minimum wage, 
and that all differences in  their transition behavior can be attributed to 
the more direct impact of the minimum wage on those paid at it relative 
to  those paid marginally over it. We can use our parameter estimates from 
the multinomial logit to see how the differences in these conditional transi- 
tion probabilities evolve over time, thus seeing if the difference is corre- 
lated with movements in the real minimum wage. This approach is particu- 
larly useful not only for seeing how minimum wage movements affect the 
probability of job loss conditional on employment (or on having come 
from nonemployment  conditional on being employed) but  also for de- 
termining whether minimum wage movements play a role in excluding 
workers completely from the labor market. We can also see which workers 
are the most likely to transition out of employment in France or come 
from nonemployment in the United States based on observable character- 
istics, such as age, conditional on the individual’s position in the earnings 
distribution. Furthermore, since our estimates are based on the entire pop- 
ulation, interpretation of these results can be more easily generalized than 
the results based on the employed subsample of our data, as in the condi- 
tional logit analysis described below. 
1 1.4.2  Conditional Logit Analysis 
Once again, let rrniw, be the real hourly minimum net wage in year t 
and let rw,  be the real hourly net wage for year t. Let age, represent  an 
individual’s age at the date t and stage, indicate that the person was em- 
ployed under some employment promotion contract that allows for sub- 
minimum wages in year  t. Finally, let e, indicate the individual’s employ- 
ment status in year t (el = 1 if employed). 
We define a person as “between” in  France if the mean of the cell in 
which the person is located at the date t is at or above the minimum wage 
at date t  but below the minimum wage (in date t  francs) at date t +  1. 
Algebraically, after defining rw, to be the mean of the cell in which the 
individual is located, this is equivalent to 
I(rrniw, I  rw, I  rrniw,+l) =  1. 
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We  also break  up the subminimum population  (those for whom rw, 
rmiw,) into two groups in France: those on employment promotion con- 
tracts (stage,) and those not on employment promotion contracts. Thus 
for France we estimate variants of the following equation for individuals: 
Pr[e,+, = lie,  = 11 
=  F(x,P + a,I(rw,  < rmiw,) x  stage, x  (rmiw,t, - rmiw,) 
+ a21(rw, < rmiw,) x  (1 - stage,) x  (rmiw,+,  - rmiw,) 
+ a,Z(rmiw,  5 rw,  I rmiw,+l)  x  (rmiw,+l  - rmiw,) x  age, 
+ cxu,I(rmiw,+,  < rw,  I  (rmiw,tl x  1.1))  x  (rmiw,tl - rmiw,) 
(1) 
x age,  17 
where F(.) is the standard logistic function. The logit described in equation 
(1) allows us to test the hypothesis, implied by the theory of competitive 
labor markets, that if  marginal productivity stays constant, increases in 
the real minimum wage render previously employed  individuals, whose 
wages fall between the old and new minima, currently unemployable. In 
particular, this specification also us to see if the effects of the minimum 
wage vary with age, and we experiment with different degrees of age aggre- 
gation to evaluate particular labor market phenomena such as the end of 
eligibility for  employment  promotion  contracts  or mandatory  military 
service. 
We  define a person as “between” in the United States if the person’s 
wage at date r + 1 is at or above the minimum wage at date t + 1 but be- 
low the minimum wage (in date t + 1 dollars) at date t. Algebraically, this 
is equivalent to 
I(rmiw,+, I: rw,,, 5 rmiw,) =  1. 
We also define the variable rmarg, as the deflated value of $4.00 at date t. 
Thus for the United States we estimate variants of the following equation: 
=  F(x,P + a,I(rw,+I  < rmiw,+l)  x (rmiw, - rmiw,tl)  x  age, 
(2)  + a,I(rmiw,+,  I  rw,tI I  rmiw,) x (rmiw, - rmzw,+,) 
x  age, + cx,l(rmiw, < rw,,, 5 rmarg,) x (rmiw, - rmiw,+l) 
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The interpretation of equation (2) is  symmetric to that of equation (1). 
Does a relatively large decrease in the real minimum wage allow previously 
unemployable  individuals to be employed? Furthermore,  in  the United 
States, we explicitly examine the impact that tips might have on our mea- 
sure of the position of a person in the wage distribution. 
Notice that the equations for the United States have empirical content 
because the nominal minimum wage rate does not change during our sam- 
ple period whereas the real minimum wage rate declines because of general 
price inflation. In contrast, the equations for France have empirical con- 
tent because the indexation formula is tied to general price inflation and 
to the growth in average hourly earnings among blue-collar workers, and 
as noted  in  subsection  11.2.1, real  minimum  wages increased  steadily 
throughout the sample period.’ 
11.5  Multinomial Logit Results 
1 1.5.1  France 
Appendix  table  llA.2 shows  some of  the  results  of estimating  the 
multinomial logit for France. We have reported  only the coefficients on 
certain key  variables; the reference  state is  the transition U to E. The 
multinomial logit models for both France and the United States were esti- 
mated on the entire population, and not just on the youth subpopulation 
(as is the case for the conditional logit models),  in  order to highlight 
differences between younger and older workers. A large number of the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero, and the differences in the 
intercepts are consistent with the raw transition probabilities (0-E is more 
probable than 0-N, N-N is more probable than N-E, etc.). Having com- 
pleted  one’s baccalaurPat (roughly the equivalent of high  school in  the 
United States) is an advantage for those employed over the minimum wage 
(0.62 vs. 0.29 for men, 1.34 vs. 1.06 for women); however, men with bacca- 
Zuur6at.s who are employed at the minimum wage seem relatively worse off 
(-0.31  vs. -0.49). This might be coherent with a signaling explanation in 
which only the low-productivity baccalaurPat holders are willing to accept 
jobs at the minimum wage. 
In general, the coefficients corresponding to transitions from marginally 
over the SMIC are intermediate between transitions from at the SMIC 
and transitions from over the SMIC. This is consistent with the idea of 
using workers paid marginally over the SMIC as a comparison group for 
the purposes of analyzing the effects of the minimum wage on the popula- 
9. Our conditional logit estimates are performed  on the set of  individuals who are em- 
ployed at some point in  the sample. Thus the coefficients should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as representative of  the entire potential labor force, but rather as appropriate for the 
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tion of workers being paid at the minimum. For French women in particu- 
lar, the time-series transition behavior of women paid marginally over the 
minimum  strongly resembles that of  women paid  at the minimum. We 
exploit these results in the conditional logit models that follow in section 
11.6. 
Since the interpretation of the raw regression coefficients is not immedi- 
ately informative, figure 11.10 explores the variation in conditional transi- 
tion probabilities out of employment with age for a French man in  1984 
who entered the labor market between 1962 and 1972, living in the Paris 
region with a baccalauriat,  and figure  1 1.1 1 shows the same conditional 
transition probabilities for a French woman with the same characteristics. 
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Fig. 11.10  Probability of leaving employment (relative to 16-18-year-olds): 
French men, 1984 
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Fig. 11.11 
French women, 1984 
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tion in the earnings distribution. The general downward trends in both 
figures are due simply to the fact that young people are more likely to 
transition out of employment independent of position in the wage distri- 
bution. Still, it is worth noting that while 51-60-year-olds  paid over the 
minimum are about a third as likely to transition out of employment than 
16-1 8-year-olds, workers paid at the minimum seem to benefit much less 
from the reduction in the probability of transitioning out of employment 
as they age. Furthermore, it seems that aging does not reduce at all the 
probability of transitioning out of the labor force for women being paid 
under the minimum. This suggests that the subminimum population of 
older women is characterized by much weaker labor force attachment than 
comparable women paid elsewhere in the wage distribution. 
1 1.5.2  United States 
Appendix  table  llA.3 shows  some  of  the  results  of  estimating  the 
multinomial logit for the United States. Once again, we have reported only 
the coefficients on certain key variables; the reference state is the transition 
E to U. A certain number of the coefficients are significantly different from 
zero, and the differences in the intercepts are consistent with the raw tran- 
sition probabilities (E-0  is more probable than N-0, E-0  is more probable 
than E-A, etc.). Having completed high school is associated with a relative 
higher share coming from employment for those employed over the mini- 
mum wage (0.75 vs. 0.49 for men, 0.65 vs. 0.37 for women); however, men 
with high school diplomas who are employed at the minimum wage come 
disproportionately from nonemployment (0.13 vs. 0.08) whereas the effect 
is opposite for women  (-0.02  vs.  0.05), although the differences in the 
estimated coefficients are small. The subminimum transitions do  not seem 
dramatically different from the at minimum transitions (the coefficients in 
the E-A column are rarely significantly different from zero), although a 
significantly smaller share of young women paid under the minimum were 
employed in the previous period, relative to those paid at the minimum. 
This suggests that low-wage employers hire relatively more from the pool 
of nonemployed, and it thus could be interpreted as running counter to 
the idea that subminimum sectors in the United States (particularly jobs 
that receive income from tips) provide more stable employment than jobs 
that pay the minimum wage. 
As in the French case, the time-series behavior  of the transitions of 
workers paid marginally over the minimum closely mimics that of workers 
paid at the minimum, further reinforcing the idea that the group of work- 
ers paid  marginally  over  the minimum  might  be  a  reasonable  control 
group for minimum wage workers. Also, as in the French case, the inter- 
pretation of the raw coefficients can be difficult. Figure 11.12 explores the 
variation in conditional (on arrival state) transition probabilities into em- 
ployment with age for an American man in  1984 who entered the labor Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  449 
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Fig. 11.12  Probability of moving into employment (relative to 16-18-year-olds): 
US. men, 1984 
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Fig. 11.13  Probability of moving into employment (relative to 16-18-year-olds): 
US. women, 1984 
market between  1962 and 1972 with a high school diploma, and figure 
1  1.13 shows the variation of the conditional transition probabilities for an 
American woman with the same characteristics. 
Clearly, in the United States, the effect of age on the transition probabil- 
ities differs dramatically from the French case. The two figures are similar 
in form, although the relative reduction in the conditional probability of 
transitioning  from  nonemployed  to  marginally  over  the  minimum  is 
stronger for men and turns back up sooner for women. The most remark- 
able difference between the French and US. cases is that while in France 
the probability of making a 0-N transition  decreases with age, there is 
either no effect or a slight increase in the relative probability of N-0  transi- 
tions (the U.S. equivalent) for older workers relative to younger workers 450  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
in our results for the United States. This could be due to the high stability 
in general of jobs that pay substantially over the minimum wage; the inter- 
cepts for E-0 transitions are significantly larger than all other estimated 
intercepts in the model. On the other hand, in the United States it seems 
that the probability of transitioning from nonemployment to marginally 
over the minimum wage is the transition the most affected by aging, while 
in France the order of magnitude of the change is about half for 31-40- 
year-olds relative to 16-18-year-olds (a 63 percent drop vs. a 27 percent 
drop for men,  a 39 percent drop vs.  a 24 percent  drop for women). If 
workers paid marginally over the minimum are indeed a reasonable con- 
trol group for minimum wage workers, the relatively feeble decline in the 
probability of having come from nonemployment experienced by workers 
paid at the minimum suggests that in the United States at least, the mini- 
mum wage is playing a role in determining the sorts of transitions that 
low-wage workers make in the labor market. 
11.6  Conditional Logit Results 
1 1.6.1  France 
Table  11.3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for France on 
young people, using broad age categories.I0 We have reported the coeffi- 
cients for the key real minimum wage variables, as well  as variables for 
several types of employment contracts in France.I’ 
The coefficients show that French men aged 25-30  with real wage rates 
in period t that are above the real minimum in t but below the real mini- 
mum wage in period t + 1 have much lower subsequent employment prob- 
abilities than similar men  paid  substantially over the period t  +  1 real 
minimum wage. The elasticity is very large: an increase of 1 percent in the 
minimum wage entails an decrease in the probability of keeping one’s job 
of 4.6 percent, relative to men aged 25-30  who are paid marginally over 
the minimum. One interpretation of these results is that although low- 
wage workers do differ from high-wage workers (as the fairly consistent 
negative coefficients suggest), the minimum wage hits workers whose real 
wages are between the two minima much harder than other low-wage 
workers. 
Similar results hold for women and people 20-24  years old, but these 
coefficients are less significant.  In general, the employment loss effects 
worsen with age among the young employed population, but the level of 
10. Appendix table 11A.4 provides descriptive statistics for the French data used in these 
regressions. 
11. We explicitly consider fixed-term contracts (CDD), youth employment schemes (young 
stagidre),  and apprenticeships, with the reference being long-term contracts (CDI). See Ab- 
owd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999) for more detail on the differences between CDD and CDI. Table 11.3  Estimated Effect of Real French Minimum Wage Increases on Subsequent Employment Probabilities: Broad Age Categories 
Standard 
Name of Effect  Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 




Real wage, < Real SMIC, and Not young stugiuirr 
Redl wage, < Real SMIC, and Young stugiuire 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,,,)*(16 5  Age, 5 19) 
(Real SMIC, c  Real wage, c Real SMIC,+,)*(ZO  5  Age, 5  24) 
(Real SMIC, C Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,,,)*(25 5  Age, 5  30) 
(Real SMIC,,, C  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,,,))*(16 5 Age, d  19) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(ZO  5 Age, c 24) 








-  33.2708 
2.9869 






























-  1.2017 
-4.8928 
1.1201 





Real wage, < Real SMIC, and Not young srugkire 
Real wage, < Real SMIC, and Young srugiuire 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,,,)*(16 c Age, c 19) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,+,)*(20  C Age, C 24) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Redl wage, 5  Real SMIC,,,)*(25 5  Age, 5 30) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5 (l.I*Real SMIC,+,))*(16  5  Age, c 19) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(ZO  c Age, c 24) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, C (l.I*Real SMIC,+,))*(25  c Age, 5 30) 
-.9351 
-1.4152 





-  11.6779 
-  5. I875 
,3164 






























-  1.2485 
-1.5537 
-  ,7447 
.0354 
-.I734 
Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1982-89,  matched year to year. 
Note: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, education (eight groups), region (Ile de France), and age (three groups), as well 
as the continuous variables labor force experience (through quartic), seniority, seniority squared, and hourly wage in year I (through cubic). All displayed coefficients except fixed- 
term contract, young sfugiuire,  and apprentice are equal to the indicated group multiplied by  the real percentage increase in the SMIC between years t and t + I  (1981 = 100). 
The coefficients and elasticities show the partial effects on the probability of employment in year t + I. given t. A separate equation was estimated for each demographic panel. 
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detail is not sufficient to speculate on why certain age groups are more 
affected than others. It is clear from the estimates of the coefficients on 
the different contract types that all of the types of contract studied here 
lead to more precarious  labor force attachment than an indefinite term 
contract  on average, but  the employment  promotion  contracts  (young 
stagiuire) seem to provide relative security for the subminimum popula- 
tion.”  Looking at these populations in more detail, in particular at what 
happens to 25-year-olds (who will no longer be eligible for employment 
promotion contracts the following year), will give us more information on 
whether the dramatic differences seen between 25-30-year-old  and 20-24- 
year-old men with wages between the two minima are due to the expira- 
tion of the protection provided by the employment promotion contracts. 
Table 11.4 gives these detailed results. 
Looking first at the men, the most remarkable feature is in fact the huge 
negative coefficient affecting 25-year-old men whose wages are between 
the two minima. This elasticity of -  15.9 (expressed as a difference from 
the marginally above category) and the subsequent negative coefficients 
for “between” men are consistent with the idea that the minimum wage 
has a  strong negative impact on subsequent employment probabilities. 
However, the presence of employment promotion contracts, and the re- 
duction in employer social insurance contributions that they imply, helps 
workers who are under age 25 to retain their jobs in the face of a steadily 
increasing real SMIC. When workers are no longer eligible for such con- 
tracts, their probability of losing their jobs increases dramatically. Relative 
to the control group of workers marginally above the SMIC, the coeffi- 
cients for 25- and 26-year-olds are significantly larger. In fact, there is no 
significant bump in the coefficients at 25 years old for the marginally above 
workers, suggesting that this phenomenon is only pertinent to minimum 
wage workers. This further reinforces  the interpretation that “between” 
workers who are eligible for employment promotion contracts are shielded 
from the negative effects of movements in the SMIC, but “older” young 
workers are not. 
On average, the coefficients for workers between the two SMICs are 
more negative than for workers marginally over the date t SMIC. The av- 
erage difference (excluding the 25-year-olds) is 7.8, suggesting that the “be- 
tween”  population might be  different from the “marginal”  population. 
Unfortunately,  none of  these differences (except for 25-year-olds) is sig- 
nificant, and in fact, none of the other coefficients for men are significantly 
different from zero. Although there are also a few significant coefficients 
in the results for women, interpretation of these results is much more dif- 
ficult. Although 23-year-old women with wages between the two minima 
12. See Bonnal, Fougkre, and Serandon (1997) for an analysis centered on the impact of 
the youth employment schemes. Table 11.4  Estimated Effect of Real French Minimum Wage Increases on Subsequent Employment Probabilities:  Detailed Age Categories 
Standard 
Name of Effect  Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
Young  Men, Hourly Wage 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(16  5 Age, 5 19) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 20) 
(Real SMIC, I  Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 21) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 22) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 23) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, I  Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 24) 
(Real SMIC, I  Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 25) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, I  Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 26) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age,  = 27) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(28  5  Age, 5 30) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, I  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(16 I  Age, 5  19) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5 (].]*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5 20) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5 21) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5  Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5  22) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, s (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5  23) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5 24) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5  25) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, I  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  26) 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5  27) 
(Real SMIC,,, I  Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(28  5  Age, 5 30) 
(con I  inued) 
4.9 184 
9.4237 
-  14.4978 





-  10.1344 
-  18.1628 
2.9091 








-  8.2901 
8.5415 
17.33  I2 


















































-  ,8079 






-.6564 Table 11.4  (continued) 
Name of Effect 
Standard 
Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
Young Women, Hourly Wage 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,+,)*(16  5 Age, 5 19) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 21) 
(Real SMIC, S  Real wage, s Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 22) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 24) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, s Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 26) 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,+,)*(28 5  Age, 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(16 5  Age, S  19) 
-  1.7276 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 20)  38.9118 
-2.5471 
-  14.8695 
-  35.7959 
-26.8  167 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5 Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 23) 
(Real SMIC, 5  Real wage,  Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 25)  4.9443 
(Real SMIC, 5 Real wage, 5  Real SMIC,+,)*(Age, = 27) 
-17.3310 
.3354 
-  18.7008 
-5.2027 
30) 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage,  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  S 20)  26.3323 
(Real SMIC,,,  5 Real wage, s (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5 21)  7.0573 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5 22) 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage, 5 (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5  23) 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5 24) 
(Real SMIC,,,  5  Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5 25) 
-  14.9729 
-4.4278 
-6.0435 
-  ,0432 
(Real SMIC,,, 5 Real wage, 5  (I.l*Real SMIC,+,))*(Age,  5  26) 
(Real SMIC,,,  5 Real wage, 5 (l.I*Real  SMIC,+,))*(Age, 5 27) 
1.5230 
7.7465 



















































-  ,7469 
2.7296 
,7876 
-  1.7468 
-  .  SO09 
-  .6784 
-  ,0054 
,1488 
,7173 
-  ,7392 
Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1982-89,  matched year to year. 
Nore: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, education (eight groups), region (Ile de France), and age 
(ten groups), fixed-term contract, young stugiuire, apprentice, paid under the SMIC and young stugiuire, and paid under the SMIC and not young stugiuire, 
as well as the continuous variables labor force experience (through quartic), seniority, seniority squared, and hourly wage in year t  (through cubic). All 
displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group multiplied by  the real percentage increase in the SMIC between years 1 and f+l (1981 = 100). The 
coefficients and elasticities show the partial effects on the probability of employment in year I+  I, given employment in year 1. Sample sizes are young men, 
30,804; young women, 26,434. Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  455 
are significantly more likely to be nonemployed the following year than 
women  who  are paid  over  the SMIC, the difference from  23-year-old 
women paid marginally over the SMIC is not significant. And the large, 
positive coefficients on 20-year-old women, again present in both the “be- 
tween” and “marginal” populations, is hard to explain. These results may 
reflect the added opportunities available for women as men go off to per- 
form their military service (and thus withdraw from the labor market), but 
such an interpretation can neither be accepted not rejected exclusively on 
the basis of the evidence presented here. 
In addition to estimating the conditional logits with “marginally over” 
the SMIC defined as 1.10 times the SMIC, we also estimated these models 
with two alternative definitions (1.15 and 1.20  times the SMIC). Table 1 1.5 
analyzes the robustness of the coefficients for the between and marginal 
categories to these changes in the definition of “marginally over.” It seems 
clear that our results are quite robust to  changes in the definition of “mar- 
ginal .” 
1 1.6.2  United States 
Table  1 I .6 shows the results of estimating equation (2) using both the 
hourly wage measure that excludes income from tips and the measure that 
Table 11.5  Robustness of Conditional Logit Results to Variations in Definition of “Marginally 
over” the Minimum 
~ 
Narrow  Medium  Wide 
Marginally  Marginally  Marginally 
Between  Over  Between  Over  Between  Over 
French youth 
Men  4.0888 




Men  1.9965 























-  1.9342 
(1.7077) 
-.5443 















-  1.6244 
(I .6484) 
Sources:  French  Labor  Force Survey, 1982-89,  matched  year  to year, and U.S. Current Population 
Survey, 1981-87, January-May  and September-December, matched year to year. 
Note: Coefficients come from logistic regressions conditional on employment at date t for France and 
date  f+I  for  the  United  States. For France,  the  categories  are  defined as “narrow”  = SMIC to 
I.lO*SMIC, “Medium” = SMIC to 1.15*SMIC, and “wide” = SMIC to I.20*SMIC. For the United 
States, the categories are defined as “narrow” = $3.35 to $3.75, “medium”  = $3.35 to $4.00, and 
“wide” = $3.35 to $4.25. For this table, “youth” is defined as ages 25 and under. See notes to tables 
11.3, 11.4, 11.6, 1 1.7, and 1 1.8 for details on other variables in the regressions. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. Table 11.6  Estimated Effect of Real US.  Minimum Wage Decreases on Prior Employment Probabilities: Total Labor Market Experience 
Name of Effect 
Standard 
Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
Young Men, Hourly Wage-No  Tips 
Real wage,+,< Real min,,,  -  ,4567  2.5368  ,8571  -.I498 
Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real min,  -  3.0723  1.6532  ,063  1  -  1.3287 
Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),  ,3153  1.6178  .8455  ,0977 
(Real wage,,, 5  Real min,,,)*Experience  ,2406  ,4178  ,5648  ,4046 
(Real min,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*Experience  -1.4714  ,2841  .ooo  1  -2.5115 
(Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*Experience  -.8961  ,2497  ,0003  -  1.3746 
Young Women, Hourly Wage-No  Tips 
Real wage,,,<  Real rnin,,,  -.0535  2.1856  ,9805  -  ,0340 
Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,  -8.3538  1.5107  ,000  I  -4.8544 
Real min, 5 Real wage,,, 5 Real ($4.00),  -2.6704  1.5055  ,076  I  -  1.8436 
(Real wage,,,  5  Real min,,,)*Experience  -  ,6488  ,2570  .01 I6  -  1.3900 
(Real min,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*Experience  -  ,9277  .2007  .ooo I  -  1.8917 
(Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*Experience  -  ,8574  .I894  .ooo 1  -  1.5564 Young Men, Hourly Wage-With  Tips 
Real wage,+,< Real rnin,,,  -2.6088  2.4905  .2949  -  1.7404 
Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,, I  Real min,  -4.3814  1.6346  ,0074  -2.4823 
Real min, 5 Real wage,,, I  Real ($4.00),  -.7521  1.6034  ,6390  -.5111 
(Real min, 5 Real wage,,, I  Real ($4,00),)*Experience  -  ,9464  ,249  1  .ooo  1  -  1.4794 
(Real wage,,,  5 Real min,,,)*Experience  ,1059  .4  154  ,7988  ,1805 
(Real min,,,  5  Real wage,,, 5  Real min,)*Experience  -  1.5673  ,2849  ,000  1  -2.6350 
Young Women, Hourly Wage-With  Tips 
Real wage,+,< Real rnin,,,  -3.0938  2.0570  ,1326  -  1.8775 
Real rnin,,, I  Real wage,,, 5  Real min,  -9.1702  1.4879  ,000  1  -5.2774 
Real min, I  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),  -  3.3 I96  1.4939  ,0263  -2.2658 
(Real wage,,, I  Real min,,,)*Experience  -.7841  2570  .0023  -  1.7565 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*Experience  -  ,9762  .2009  ,000  1  -  1.9923 
(Real min, 5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*Experience  -  ,885  1  ,1894  .ooo  1  -1.6186 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1981-87,  January-May  and September-December,  matched year to year. 
Note: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (three groups), nonwhite, and married; and years 
of schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real wage (I982 prices, through cubic). All  displayed coefficients are equal to the 
indicated group times the real decrease (absolute value of  the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between years  t and t+ 1. The coefficients and 
elasticities show the partial effects on the probability of employment in year f, given employment in year t+ I. A separate equation was estimated for each 
panel. Sample sizes are young men, 41,001; young women, 38,992. 458  J. M. Abowd, F. Kramarz, T. Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
includes income from tips, and interacting with total labor market experi- 
ence instead of age.I3  In every case, individuals who are employed in year 
t + 1  were more likely to have been unemployed or not in the labor force 
in t if their real wage in t + 1 was between the real minimum wage in years 
t  and  t  +  1. The magnitudes of these effects are large, with elasticities 
for men with zero experience of -  1.42 to -  1.97 and for women with no 
experience of -3.01.  Once again, we refer to comparisons with the “mar- 
ginal’’ group-that  is, workers who are paid  marginally  above the old 
(date t)  minimum wage-to  get at the direct effect of movements in the 
real minimum wage on transitions into employment. By  weighting the 
different experience groups, a decrease in  the real minimum wage  of  1 
percent between t -  1 and t is related to an increased probability of having 
been nonemployed at t -  1 of 2.2 percent (in difference from the marginal 
workers) for those men who are paid between the t and t + 1 minimum 
wages. These results  are consistent  with  the neoclassical  idea that de- 
creases in the real minimum wage make nonemployed workers easier to 
employ and these workers enter disproportionately between the two mini- 
mum wages. This decreases the share of those employed at date t + 1 who 
were employed at date t for the “between” group more than for other 
groups. 
It is interesting to note the differences, or rather lack  of differences, 
between the results that measure wages with and without tips. None of 
the qualitative results seem sensitive to the manner in  which  we  define 
wages; however, some intuition can be gleaned from how the coefficients 
seem to shift when passing from measures without tips to measures with 
tips. All of the coefficients shown in table 1 1.6  become more negative when 
tips are included in the wage measure. This is also consistent  with the 
standard neoclassical  model, which would imply that the measure with 
tips more accurately describes a worker’s marginal productivity and would 
conclude that the less significant coefficients in the estimation without tips 
are affected by measurement error. Nevertheless, due to the lack of any 
qualitative difference between the results with and without tips, and be- 
cause our measure without  tips  uses reported  rather  than constructed 
data,I4 the rest of our results for the United States will be based on the 
wage measure that excludes tips. 
Table 11.7 reestimates equation (2) using the broad age categories, as in 
table 1 1.3. As was suggested by the negative coefficients on the experience 
interaction terms in table 1  1.6, the effects of the minimum wage worsen as 
young workers get older. The differences between workers paid between 
the two minima and workers paid marginally over the t minimum are still 
13. Appendix table  1 IA.5 provides descriptive statistics for the U.S. data used in these re- 
14. Welch (1997) provides evidence on  various sorts of measurement error in the CPS and 
gressions. 
hints that hours are likely to be a greater source of measurement error than wages. Table 11.7  Estimated Effect of Real US. Minimum Wage increases on Prior Employment Probabilities (excluding tips): Broad Age Categories 
Name of  Effect 
Standard 
Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
~~  ~  ~ 
Young Men, Hourly Wage 
Real wage,+,< Real rnin,,,  ,6119  1.9147  ,7493  ,2007 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(16 5 Age, 5 19)  -6.1455  1.3807  ,000 1  -2.9233 
(Real min,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(20 5 Age, 5 24)  -  1 1.8902  1.9536  .0001  -  4.209 5 
(Real rnin,,,  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(25 5  Age, 5 30)  -19.4188  3.1495  .OOOl  -5.9588 
(Real min, 5 Real wage,,,  Real ($4.00),)*(16  Age, 5 19)  -  ,9696  1.3901  .4855  -.3767 
(Real min, 5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(20 5  Age, s 24)  -5.9107  1.7693  .0008  -  1.4697 
(Real min, 5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(25 S Age, 5 30)  -9.8243  2.4330  .0001  -  1.8055 
~~ 
Young Women, Hourly Wage 
Real wage,,,<  Real rnin,,,  -3.2195  1.6924  ,0571  -1.1762 
(Real min,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(16 5 Age, 5  19)  -9.1433  1.3730  ,000 1  -4.3346 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(20 5 Age, 5 24)  -14.0812  1.6615  ,000 I  -4.8644 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(25 5 Age, 5 30)  -19.8125  1.8812  ,000 1  -7.1220 
(Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(16  Age, 5  19)  -3.0577  1.4261  ,0320  -1.1732 
(Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(20 5  Age, 5  24)  -8.4481  1.4157  ,000  I  -2.2399 
(Real min, 5  Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(25 5 Age, 5 30)  -  12.5349  1.5423  .0001  -3.2334 
Source:  Current Population Survey, 1981-87, January-May  and September-December,  matched year to year. 
Note: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (three groups), nonwhite, married, and age (three 
groups); and years of  schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real wage (1982 prices, through cubic). All displayed coefficients 
are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between years t and t+ 1. The 
coefficients and elasticities show the partial effects on the probability of employment in year  f, given employment in year t+l. A separate equation was 
estimated for each demographic panel. Sample sizes are young men, 41,001; young women, 38,992. 460  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
significant for all age groups, and the elasticities are still large. For the 
oldest age group, a decrease of 1 percent in the real minimum wage at t is 
associated  with  a  5.96 percent  higher  chance  that a  given  “between” 
worker came from nonemployment, whereas such a change is associated 
with only an 1.81 percent higher chance for “marginal” workers. Unlike 
the French case, although 25-30-year-olds  with date t + 1 wages between 
the two minima have a higher chance of having come from nonemploy- 
ment than do 20-24-year-olds,  the difference is not nearly as dramatic. 
This is not surprising, as there existed no nationwide employment promo- 
tion schemes in the United States in the 1980s that would have induced 
effects similar to the French case. 
One might think that our approach of considering  previous employment 
in the United States could be subject to the possibility, especially among 
young people, that many of the transitions from nonemployment to em- 
ployment are first jobs after the end of s~hooling.’~  Since we  control for 
schooling as a set of regressors reflecting different levels of educational 
attainment, looking at the pattern of age coefficients for “between” work- 
ers and “marginal” workers should allow us to ignore such considerations 
to the extent that entry into the labor force does not occur disproportion- 
ately in a particular wage category. Table 1 1.8, which provides our condi- 
tional logit analysis at the same level of aggregation as table 1 1.4, therefore 
allows us  to concentrate more precisely on how minimum wage move- 
ments affect the stability of early career employment at different points in 
the wage distribution. 
As was the case in our earlier results, the probability that a worker came 
from nonemployment is higher among the set of workers with date t + 1 
real wages between the two minima than among the set of workers with 
date t + 1 real wages marginally above the date t real minimum. The same 
holds true for a comparison of “between” workers with workers earning 
substantially more than the date t real minimum, and these differences are 
often significant. Despite a lot of variation across the different ages, there 
appears to be a secular trend toward a higher and higher share of workers 
coming from nonemployment  as age increases, and this trend is steeper 
among “between” workers than among “marginal” workers, particularly 
for young men. This is  not the case in France, and it may suggest that 
information is revealed faster in the United States and that as workers age, 
the sorts of low-wage jobs they can find become increasingly precarious. 
Since there do  not exist systematic, targeted programs that should affect 
transitions among young people throughout the United States in the same 
manner (with the exception of education), interpretation of these coeffi- 
cients is not as straightforward as in the French case. However, if (as men- 
15. See Topel and Ward (1992),  among others, for an analysis of early career mobility in 
the United States. Table 11.8  Estimated Effect of Real US.  Minimum Wage Increases on Prior Employment Probabilities (excluding tips): Detailed Age Categories 
Name of Effect 
Standard 
Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
Young Men, Hourly Wage 
Real wage,,,  < Real rnin,,, 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,, I  Real min,)*(16 5 Age, I  19) 
(Real min,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5 20) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(Age, 5  21) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5  22) 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5 23) 
(Real rnin,,, I  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5 24) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5  25) 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(Age, 5 26) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(Age, 4 27) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(28 5 Age, 5  30) 
(Real rnin,,, I  Real wage,,, I  Real ($4.00),)*(16 5 Age, 4 19) 
(Real rnin,,, I  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 20) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 21) 
(Real min,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 22) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5  23) 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 24) 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,, 5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 25) 
(Real rnin,,, I  Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5  26) 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 27) 
(Real min,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(28 5  Age, 5 30) 
,2962 
-6.5106 
-  1 1.6092 
-9.0680 
-7.3453 
-  22.0209 
-15.1148 
-  16.6557 
-  17.9004 
-  15.9424 
-22.05  I4 
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-  1.5576 
-2.4804 
-  1.9561 
(continued) Table 11.8  (continued) 
Name of Effect 
Standard 
Coefficient  Error  p-Value  Elasticity 
Young Women, Hourly Wage 
Real wage,,,  < Real min,,,  -3.7559  1.6913  .0264  -  1.3722 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(16 5 Age, c  19)  -9.8220  1.3730  .0001  -4.6564 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5  20)  -  12.2205  2.8456  .0001  -4.6320 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5 21)  -  12.8276  3.1 141  .0001  -4.6853 
(Real min,,, 5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5  22)  -  13.4058  3.6339  .0002  -4.4009 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(Age, 5 23)  -14.131  I  4.2524  .0009  -4.1771 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, c  24)  -  14.0301  4.2585  .oo I0  -4.1895 
(Real min,+, 5 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5  25)  -23.5188  4.2544  ,000  I  -9.5817 
(Real rnin,,,  4 Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(Age, 5 26)  -  18.8257  4.0242  ,000  I  -6.4372 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real min,)*(Age, I  27)  -20.1282  4.6770  ,000  I  -6.8814 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real min,)*(28 5 Age, 5  30)  -  19.6787  2.4999  ,000  1  -6.9948 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(16  5 Age, 5 19)  -3.4490  1.4233  .O 154  -  1.3234 
(Real rnin,,, 5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 20)  -2.3108  2.8808  ,4225  -  ,5968 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 22)  -9.1566  3.0945  ,003 1  -2.5897 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 23)  -  13.4398  3.2502  ,000  1  -3.4858 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age,  5 24)  -  14. I707  3.4026  .0001  -3.7468 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age,  5 25)  -  16.7514  3.1826  .0001  -4.7081 
(Real rnin,,, 5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(Age, I  26)  -7.2195  3.7185  .0522  -  1.5576 
(Real rnin,,,  5  Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age, 5 27)  -6.5597  3.5805  .0669  -  1.4072 
(Real rnin,,,  5 Real wage,,,  5  Real ($4.00),)*(28  S  Age, 5 30)  -  15.0802  2.0915  ,000  I  -4.2146 
(Real rnin,,, 5 Real wage,,,  5 Real ($4.00),)*(Age,  5 21)  -4.9630  2.93 I8  ,0905  -  1.3019 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1981-87,  January-May  and September-December,  matched year to year. 
Note: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (three groups), nonwhite, married, and age (ten 
groups); and years of  schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real wage (1982 prices, through cubic). All displayed coefficients 
are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between years t and t+ 1. The 
coefficients  and elasticities show the partial effects on the probability of employment in year t, given employment in year t+ 1. A separate equation was 
estimated for each demographic panel. Sample sizes are young men, 41,001;  young women, 38,992. Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the U.S.  463 
tioned above) the coefficients corresponding to  a given age are particularly 
strong, and if this age corresponds to the age at which many  students 
typically finish a certain diploma, one might conclude that the coefficients 
are capturing disproportionate  entry into the labor force at particular 
places in the wage distribution.  Unfortunately, the most remarkable co- 
efficients (23 years old for men and 25 years old for women) are not con- 
current with ages at which a significant portion of the future workforce is 
in their last year of  schooling. There does not seem to be any clear inter- 
pretation  for the particular age pattern of the coefficients in the United 
States. 
Finally, to promote comparability between our analysis, which is done 
conditional on the employment state in either year t (France) or year t + 1 
(United States), and other analyses, which consider the effects of the mini- 
mum wage unconditional on the previous or future employment state, we 
compute the implied unconditional elasticities implied by  our estimates. 
To calculate an unconditional elasticity we  apply Bayes law to obtain the 
relation between the forms of the analysis equations we  used for France 
and the United States. Hence, we have 
Pr[e,+, = lie,  = l,rmiw,,rmiw,tl] 
To calculate the elasticity we use the following derivative formula: 
Notice that the derivative in equation (4)  simplifies because the denomina- 
tor in the ratio of unconditional  probabilities  in  equation  (3) does not 
depend on the future minimum wage. The right-hand side of equation (4) 
has two terms. For France, we  can estimate only the first of these two 
terms because the real minimum wage is always increasing. The conditions 
necessary for estimating the second term occur in the United States, where 
the real minimum wage is always decreasing. To estimate the uncondi- 
tional elasticity in equation (4) we  must make an assumption regarding 
the term that cannot be estimated in the particular country. We assume 
that this term is zero, which means that increases in the real minimum 
wage do not change the rate at which nonemployed workers become em- 
ployed and, conversely, decreases in the real minimum wage do not change 464  J. M. Abowd, F. Kramarz, T. Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
Table 11.9  Elasticity Estimates for Young Men and Women: Rate of Change of 
Employment Probability for  1 Percent Increase in Real Minimum Wage 
France  United States 
Conditional (aggregated over uge groups) 
Young men  -2.489  -2.234 
Young women  -  1.044  -1.873 
Young men  -  ,203  -.123 
Young women  -.I08  -.I27 
Unconditional (aggregated over age groups) 
Source; France, table 1 1.3, figs. 1 I .6 and 1 1.7, and Labor Force Survey. United States, table 
1 1.7, figs. 1 1.8 and 11.9, and Current Population Survey. 
Note: The conditional elasticity is the weighted average of the elasticities for each age group 
in tables 11.3 and 11.7 reported as the difference between the elasticity for the “at minimum” 
group as compared to the “marginally above” group. The unconditional elasticity is an esti- 
mate of the rate of  change of the employment probability in period t+ 1  given a  1 percent 
increase in the real minimum wage between periods t and t+ 1. 
the rate at which employed workers at t remain employed at t  +  1. Our 
results are summarized in table 11.9. To  take advantage of the structure 
of our estimates in tables 1 1.3 and 1 1.7, we  computed the required condi- 
tional elasticities in equation (4) according to the following formula for 
France, which assumes that the appropriate control group is individuals 
who are marginally over the minimum wage: 
alnPr[e,,, = lie, = 11 
alnPr[e,,, = lie, = l,e,atminimum] 
!In  rmiw,,, 
= Pr [at  minimum]^ 
Pr[Pl,  1 
aInPr[e,,,  =  lie,  = l,~,margina~] 
Pln rmiw,,, 
- 
where the summation is taken over the three age groups. We use the com- 
parable formula for the United States. 
1 1.7  Conclusion 
This paper has shown that for young people in both France and the 
United States, movements in the real minimum wage are associated with 
significant employment effects, typically in the direction predicted by com- 
petitive labor market theory. In France, as the real SMIC increased over 
the period  1982-89,  a certain share of young French workers had real 
wages that fell between the increasing consecutive real minimum wages. Minimum Wages and Youth Employment in France and the US.  465 
For workers in  this situation, subsequent employment probabilities  fell 
significantly. However, participation in employment promotion programs 
seemed to shield these workers from some of the effects of the increasing 
real SMIC, and when this eligibility ended, the probability of subsequent 
nonemployment shot up dramatically. In the United States, a comparable 
effect of a real minimum wage moving in the opposite direction occurred, 
as many workers had market wage rates that were passed by the declining 
real minimum wage over the period  1981-87.  American workers whose 
current real wage rate would have been below the real minimum wage in 
earlier periods were much less likely to have been employed in those ear- 
lier periods. 
By  comparing effects of minimum  wage movements on workers em- 
ployed at the minimum with  the effects on those employed marginally 
above it, we  identify the direct effects of the minimum wage, as distinct 
from heterogeneity across the wage distribution in labor force attachment 
and response to macroeconomic shocks. We  suppose that these workers 
have identical labor supply behavior, but they also have much higher sub- 
sequent reemployment probabilities in France as well as much higher prior 
employment probabilities in the United States. Within the youth popula- 
tion, these strong effects increase with age in the United States, and the 
pattern in France is dominated by  eligibility for employment promotion 
contracts. Across the population as whole, however, our multinomial logit 
results suggest that in both countries, it is youths who are most affected 
by movements in the real minimum wage. 
Even  if  the  conditional  elasticities in  question  are large,  the at-risk 
groups (workers between two minimum wages) are relatively small-8  per- 
cent of young men and 10 percent of young women in France, 6 percent 
of young men and 7 percent of young women in the United States. Thus 
overall unconditional elasticities tend to be much lower than the elasticit- 
ies conditional on being between the two minima. If the relevant policy 
question concerns the impact of the minimum wage on those individuals 
most likely to be affected by it (i.e., those currently paid at the minimum 
wage), our results suggest that there are much larger negative employment 
effects on this group, especially as compared to the group in the wage 
distribution  marginally  above  the  minimum,  than other research  has 
found. Appendix 
Table llA.l  Statistical History of the Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel  de  Croissance (SMIC) 
Gross  Employee  Employer 
Net  Monthly Total  Payroll  Payroll 
Statutory  Hourly  Real Hourly  Monthly  Monthly  Compensation  Tax Rate  Tax Rate  Consumer 
Hours per  SMIC  SMIC (1970)  SMIC  SMIC  cost  ('YO at  ((%I  at  Price Index 
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Source: Friez and Julhes (1998). 
Note:  Data for 1950-69  are for the earlier minimum wage system (suhire minimum interprofessionnel guruntie). Table llA.2  Multinomial Logit Results for France 
Transition 
Men  Women 










Age = 22-25 
1.39  -2.98  -3.81 
(.91)  (37)  (33) 
-.I1  -.I3  -.I8 
(.12)  (.12)  (.08) 
-.28  -.I1  -.23 
(.12)  (.12)  (.OX) 
-.07  -.I4  -.21 
(.I21  (.12)  (.08) 
-.I6  .06  -.07 
(.12)  (.I2)  (.OX) 
-.30  .OO  -.08 
(.I2)  (.I2)  (.OX) 
-.39  .MI  .os 
(.12)  (.12)  (.08) 
-.34  .24  .I4 
(.I2)  (.13)  (.08) 
(.16)  (.13)  (.OX) 
.60  -.68  -21 
(.)I)  (.13)  (.07) 
-.26  -.31  -.49 
-.42  -4.52 
(.41)  (1.02) 
.26  .32 
(.06)  (.13) 
.53  .64 
(.06)  (.13) 
.30  .45 
(.06)  (.13) 
.s9  .57 
(.06)  (.13) 
.44  .64 
(.06)  (.13) 
.43  .33 
(.06)  (.13) 
.S6  .49 
(.06)  (.14) 
(.06)  (.13) 
(.06)  (.16) 
-.02  .42 
-1.29  -1.02 
Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1982-89.  matched year to year. 
Note:  Equations estimated  by multinomial  logit. Transitions identified  by U = under the minimum, A = at the minimum, M  = marginally over  the minimum, 0 = over  the minimum, N  = 
nonemployment, and E = employment. In addition to the coefficients shown, the regression  included  indicator variables for region (Ile de France), eight education categories, eight age categories. 
and three entry cohorts. The reference transition was U-E. The reference categories for the indicator variables were year = 1981, education = no degree. age = 41-50  years old, and year of entry 
into labor market = before 1961. Separate equations were estimated for men and women. Sample sizes were men, 145,646; women, 166,716. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table 11  A.3  Multinomial Logit Results for the United States 
Transition 
Men  Women 
Effect  N-U  N-A  E-A  N-M  E-M  N-0  E-0  N-N  E-N  N-U  N-A  E-A  N-M  E-M  N-0  E-0  N-N  E-N 
Intercept  -1.61  .II  .30  .SO  1.20  4.28  6.60  -30  -.39  -49  2.74  .81  3.45  1.94  5.56  6.91  .34  1.40 
(1.06)  (36)  (S8)  (.91)  (34)  (SI)  (.44)  (.44)  (.46)  (.67)  (37)  (.40)  (.61)  (.38)  (.42)  (.32)  (.32)  (.34) 
19x2  .04  .  I7  .02  .I3  .I0  .26  .07  .I6  .06  .06  .09  .04  .09  -  .02  .  I4  .09  .06  .02 
(.07)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.06)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.03)  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
1983  ~  .07  .22  .OO  .  I8  .0S  .34  .09  .  IS  -  .05  .OO  .  I3  .OO  .07  -.06  .17  .I  I  .OS  -  .01 
(.08)  (.05)  (.04)  (.06)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.03)  (.04)  C.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
1984  .O  I  .22  .OS  .20  .08  .30  .  I6  .20  .03  .01  .  I6  -  .06  .  I2  -  .01  .24  .I9  .I0  .OS 
(.09)  (.06)  (.06)  (.07)  (.05)  (.05)  (.OS)  (.OS)  (.OS)  (.06)  (.04)  (.04)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
(.12)  (.OX)  (.07)  (.09)  (.07)  (.07)  (.06)  (.06)  (.06)  (.08)  (.06)  (.OS)  (.06)  (.05)  (.05)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04) 
(.OX)  (.OS)  (.OS)  (.06)  (.OS)  (.05)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.05)  (.04)  (.03)  (.04)  (.03)  C.03)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
(.09)  (.07)  (.OS)  (.07)  (.OS)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.04)  (.04)  (.06)  (.OS)  (.04)  (.06)  (.04)  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
(.27)  (.21)  (.14)  (.22)  (.13)  (.12)  (.II)  (.II)  (.II)  (.16)  (.I))  (.lo)  (.14)  (.09)  (.lo)  (.OX)  (.OX)  (.08) 
1985  .01  .  I6  .02  .22  .I7  .34  .27  .27  .06  -  .08  .I  I  -_  12  .21  -  .04  .26  .22  .06  .02 
1986  -.06  .09  -.OX  .20  .06  .35  .20  .21  .OS  -.05  .09  -.07  .I6  -.06  .36  .29  .I0  .OX 
High school  -.I2  .I3  .OX  .I6  .I2  .49  .7S  .I2  .38  -.I4  .OS  -.02  .I9  .20  .37  .6S  -.05  .22 
Age = 22-25  .09  .I3  .I0  .2S  .I4  .20  -.I1  -36  -.71  .I3  .63  .21  .76  .2S  .S2  .21  -.64  -.21 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1981-87. January-May  and September-December, matched year to year. 
Nule:  Equations estimated by  multinomial logit. Transitions  identified by  U = under the minimum, A = at the minimum, M = marginally over the minimum, 0 = over the minimum, N = 
nonemployment, and E = employment. In addition to the coefficients shown, the regression included indicator variables for six education categories, eight age categories, and three entry cohorts. 
The reference transition was E-U. The reference categories for the indicator variables were year = 19x1, education = no diploma, age = 61 years old or older, and year of entry into labor market = 
before 1961. Separate equations were estimated for men and women. Sample sizes were men, 162,073; women, 199,682. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table llA.4  Descriptive Statistics Conditional on Employment: France 
Entire Population  Youth 
Men  Women  Men  Women 








Year = 1988 
Year = 1987 
Year = 1986 
Year = 1985 
Year = 1984 
Year = 1983 
Year = 1982 
No education 
Elementary school 
Junior high school 
Basic vocationalltechnical 
Advanced vocationaVtechnical school 
Bucculuur6ut (high school) 
Technical college or university 
Grad school or postcollege professional school 
Employed next period? 
Observations under SMIC and Sfugiaire 
Observations under SMIC and Not sfugiuire 
Observations between two real SMlCs 















.  I479 
,2407 













































.  I420 
,1430 



























































































24.9998  3.4430 
4.4259  6.1117 
6.8722  10.8535 
.0357  .  I756 
.0065  ,0389 
.0173  ,0986 
,2217  ,4151 
,0629  ,2428 
.I 349  ,341  5 
.I352  ,3419 
,1401  ,3471 
.  I402  ,3471 
,1490  ,3561 
,1567  ,3635 
,1635  1.5493 
.0963  .2908 
.I055  .3072 
,3129  .4632 
.OM7  ,2831 
,0921  ,2878 
,1008  ,2891 
,0401  ,1815 






Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1982-89,  matched year to year. 
Nofe:  S.D. = standard deviation. “Youth is defined as ages 30 and under. Table llA.5  Descriptive Statistics Conditional on Employment: United States 
~~  ~~ 
Entire Population  Youth 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
Indicator  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 




Year = 1981 
Year = 1982 
Year = 1983 
Year = 1984 




Employed previous period? 
Observations under minimum wage 
Observations between two real minimum wages 







































































































.3  176 
.7977 













,421  1 
,443  1 
,4655 
,4017 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1981-87, January-May  and September-December, matched year to year. 
Note: S.D. = standard deviation. “Youth” is defined as ages 30 and under. 472  J. M. Abowd, F.  Kramarz, T.  Lemieux, and D. N. Margolis 
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